I.
In 1998,
The Lancet published a
fraudulent study linking MMR vaccines to autism. The paper was later retracted, and subsequent studies have demonstrated the purported link to be spurious. Nevertheless, there remains a strong segment of the U.S. population that continues to worry about these vaccines and autism.
Brenden Nyhan, a professor of political science at Dartmouth who works on these sorts of issues,
recently published the results of an ambitious three year study of some two thousand parents. He wanted to test what sort of campaigns could change people's minds about vaccines. One group of parents was given information about how there is no link between the MMR vaccine and autism; a second group received information about the dangers against which inoculation protects; a third group received photographs of children suffering from the diseases; a final group received a dramatic story about an infant who almost died of measles.
The results? Worse than nothing: in many cases, the parents' belief in the vaccine/autism link actually increased.
Fortunately, Nyhan deliberately selected a group of parents that are
nothing like you and me, because we would
never make mistakes like that. When
we come across evidence that our beliefs are wrong,
we simply change our beliefs... right?
As people who are interested in what is true, we should be disturbed by this and similar research demonstrating something we have probably already noticed about ourselves: despite our best intentions, we often do a poor job of evaluating our preconceptions. We have a tendency to go on believing whatever we believe, even when we encounter evidence and argument demonstrating those beliefs to be false. Instead of asking what beliefs the evidence supports, we ask whether the evidence can be made to fit our beliefs -- and if the answer is "no," we often dismiss the evidence.
We therefore need "truth strategies" to compensate for our mind's tendency to persist in false belief.
II.
In a
brief essay, Paul Graham argues that it is precisely in those cases where our identities are implicated in an issue -- notably, religion and politics -- that our ability to think clearly most readily breaks down. When our beliefs involve issues with which we identify, even the most straightforward matters of fact become a serious threat to "who we are," and our presumable interest in believing things that are true gets pushed out of the way by a survival instinct that not only makes us impervious to correction but often strengthens our errors.
Researchers like Nyhan have come up with a clever way to work around this difficulty: affirmation. In a series of experiments, researchers took a group of people with erroneous beliefs, gave them corrective information, and recorded the results. Predictably, the group had very low rates of correction, often strengthening their mistaken beliefs. A second group, however, experienced a different intervention. Just before being presented with the corrective information, participants in the second group were instructed to write short essays in which they listed positive traits about themselves. With this brief exercise in self-affirmation, people suddenly became much more capable of rationally evaluating what they thought they knew. By centering identity on positive traits, the researchers helped participants to minimize their identity with respect to the political issues for which they were testing.
Truth Strategy #1: refocus your identity away from the subject matter at issue.
When you are about to encounter evidence or arguments regarding an issue that touches on your identity, it is a good idea to stop and create a list of things you like about yourself. For best effect, the list should be written or spoken aloud (although this is not always possible). Thus prepared, you will be in a much better place to fairly and reasonably evaluate your beliefs.
III.
This strategy can be seen as a special case of Graham's more general argument:
The most intriguing thing about this theory, if it's right, is that it explains not merely which kinds of discussions to avoid, but how to have better ideas. If people can't think clearly about anything that has become part of their identity, then all other things being equal, the best plan is to let as few things into your identity as possible.
From this perspective, self-affirmation is a way of minimizing identity in salient areas by displacing it toward other ones. The more aspects of our lives that we classify as part of our identities, the more frequently we render ourselves incapable of believing what is true. The less frequently our identities are implicated in our beliefs, the more we are able to think clearly.
Truth Strategy #2: keep your identity small.
For example, a "Christian" who identifies rather minimally with the creeds of the early Church will have a smaller identity in that respect than someone who identifies with the Presbyterian Book of Order. Likewise, an orthodox Christian may be more capable of evaluating the merits of evolutionary biology than someone whose religious identity is wrapped up in the young-earth creationism movement. At the other end of the spectrum, you have
teenagers killing each other over identities that include beliefs about whether Chevy or Ford makes a better truck.
We have a certain amount of control regarding the "belief territory" over which we choose to extend our identity. To the extent we wish to have true beliefs, we can work to minimize this territory.
IV.
Of course, it is not as though we can simply jettison with a moment's resolution identities that have accrued over our entire lives, particularly when many of those identities operate below the level of conscious reflection. Still less would it be possible (or desirable) to live a life without identities at all.
Truth Strategy #3: develop counter-identities friendly to truth.
For many years, I have viewed myself as "someone who frequently changes his mind." While there may be drawbacks to such an identity, one specific advantage is that it makes it easier for me to correct my beliefs when they are demonstrated false (note that "easier" is not the same as "easy"). We can begin to cultivate similar habits of thinking that help us construct identities that are actively oriented toward the ability to appropriately evaluate beliefs.
Yudkowsky provides a series of self-admonitions directed at this end:
"That which can be destroyed by the truth should be."
"Surrender to the truth as quickly as I can."
"Be faithless to my cause and betray it to a stronger enemy."
"Do not believe I do others a favor if I accept their arguments; the favor is to me."
Finally, the
Litany of Tarski, which is adaptable to any situation:
"If the sky is blue,
I desire to believe that the sky is blue;
If the sky is not blue,
I desire to believe that the sky is not blue.
Let me not become attached to beliefs I may not want."
Micah's first race was the 100 yd freestyle relay.
This one is a breakfast pizza, but we had it for dinner. The recipe is rather lengthy, so I won't rewrite all of it here, but it was pretty simple. Cook the bacon until it is almost crisp, then toss your pizza dough and sprinkle a little olive oil on top. Cover with thinly sliced tomatoes and mozzarella cheese, bake 5 minutes. Remove from oven, sprinkle on thinly sliced basil and the bacon, then carefully crack an egg in the center of each pizza. Sprinkle with salt and pepper, bake for an additional 10-12 minutes until the egg whites look set (the yolk should still be runny). Since it was a week night, I cheated and used a par-baked pizza crust, so the baking times turned out to be too long for the crust and it got pretty crisp. I also had trouble getting the egg whites to set; by the time they were done, the yolk was cooked too. But, we both still really liked them and are looking forward to making this recipe again.
