In the previous two posts concerning miracles, I was operating under a definition of miracles given by St. Thomas: "those things
must properly be called miraculous which are done by divine power apart from the order
generally followed in things." I took the "order generally followed in things" in a strict sense: whatever activity is in the nature of things, considered in the generality. The moments following the big bang, though singular so far as we know, follow on the order of things, so are non-miraculous; if a prior people took them to be miracles, they were simply mistaken by virtue of their ignorance.We may call this an "ontic theory" of miracles: the category "miracle" identifies an ontic phenomenon.
There is, however, another way to understand miracles. If the "order generally followed in things" refers not to the nature of things but to our understanding of them, then the miraculous is that which is done by divine power apart from what we know of how things generally operate. We may call this an "epistemic theory" of miracles: the category "miracle" identifies an epistemic phenomenon.
St. Augustine argues that if we discover in some thing whose nature is known to us an alteration or variation in its properties, this is nevertheless not contrary to nature. He quotes from the scholar Marcus Varro, then analyzes the passage:
"[Varro:] 'There occurred a remarkable celestial portent; for Castor records that, in the brilliant star Venus, called Vesperugo by Plautus, and the lovely Hesperus by Homer, there occurred so strange a prodigy, that it changed its color, size, form, course, which never happened before nor since. Adrastus of Cyzicus, and Dion of Naples, famous mathematicians, said that this occurred in the reign of Ogyges.'
So great an author as Varro would certainly not have called this a portent had it not seemed to be contrary to nature. For we say that all portents are contrary to nature; but they are not so. For how is that contrary to nature which happens by the will of God, since the will of so mighty a Creator is certainly the nature of each created thing? A portent, therefore, happens not contrary to nature, but contrary to what we know as nature."
On this view, then, the term "miracle" marks an epistemic condition. As
Spinoza puts it, "a miracle is an event of which the causes cannot be explained by the natural reason through a reference to ascertained workings of nature." This approach has several advantages with respect to the ontic theory.
In the first place, it solves the difficulty articulated in my first post on the subject, in which I observed that the ontic theory, while defending the possibility of miracles, entails that we should never believe a miracle to have happened. On the epistemic theory, we are always justified in believing a miracle to have happened when, after seeking to make a natural explanation, we are unable to do so.
Second, the epistemic theory solves the difficulty articulated in my second post on the subject, in which I observed that the ontic theory entails a contradiction in God. On the epistemic theory, every miracle is a consistent with and a confirmation of God's providential governance of the universe.
Third, the epistemic theory addresses a further difficulty with the ontic theory, which we might call the "poor watchmaker" problem. If a person makes a watch of great complexity and beauty, only it does not accomplish the timekeeping for which it was made such that its designer must periodically step in and correct its clockwork mechanism, we would rightly conclude that this clockmaker is poor in power and knowledge. So with God on the ontic theory of miracles (though the example would have to be adjusted, for God's creative work includes conservation).
Spinoza articulates this eloquently. "Nor is there any sound reason for limiting the power and efficacy of nature, and asserting that her laws are fit for certain purposes, but not for all; for as the efficacy and power of nature, are the very efficacy and power of God, and as the laws and rules of nature are the decrees of God, it is in every way to be believed that the power of nature is infinite, and that her laws are broad enough to embrace everything conceived by the Divine intellect; the only alternative is to assert that God has created nature so weak, and has ordained for her laws so barren, that He is repeatedly compelled to come afresh to her aid if He wishes that she should be preserved, and that things should happen as He desires: a conclusion, in my opinion, very far removed from reason." The ontic theory seems to entail that the works of God are lacking, such that a violation of them is needful. The epistemic theory, on the contrary, takes every miracle as a testament to God's incredible omnipotence and omniscience.
On the epistemic view, therefore, every miracle is, in the words of
St. Augustine, an opportunity to offer praise to "God, who made the world full of countless miracles in sky, earth, air, and waters, while itself is a miracle unquestionably greater and more admirable than all the marvels it is filled with."
